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Experimental demonstration of quantum digital
signatures using phase-encoded coherent
states of light
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Digital signatures are frequently used in data transfer to prevent impersonation, repudiation
and message tampering. Currently used classical digital signature schemes rely on public key
encryption techniques, where the complexity of so-called ‘one-way’ mathematical functions is
used to provide security over sufﬁciently long timescales. No mathematical proofs are known
for the long-term security of such techniques. Quantum digital signatures offer a means
of sending a message, which cannot be forged or repudiated, with security veriﬁed by
information-theoretical limits and quantum mechanics. Here we demonstrate an experi-
mental system, which distributes quantum signatures from one sender to two receivers and
enables message sending ensured against forging and repudiation. Additionally, we analyse
the security of the system in some typical scenarios. Our system is based on the interference
of phase-encoded coherent states of light and our implementation utilizes polarization-
maintaining optical ﬁbre and photons with a wavelength of 850 nm.
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A
lice and Bob have become two of the most important
ﬁgures in the science of information security, where Alice
typically takes the role of sender and Bob receiver.
To ensure the validity of important communications, Alice wants
to transmit a message to Bob in such a way that he can verify that
the message came from her and was not altered in transmission.
Additionally it is required that a message that has been validated
by one party is further validated by all other parties it is
forwarded to. Modern information networks make extensive use
of digital signatures to verify the origin and authenticity of
messages. These digital signatures are typically based on so-called
‘trapdoor one-way functions’ used in public key cryptography1–3,
which are easy to perform one way but computationally intensive
to reverse without prior information. This prior information
forms what is known as a ‘private key’, kept secret by Alice and
used to decrypt information encrypted using her publicly
available ‘public key’. However, there is currently no known
proof that reversing such trapdoor one-way functions without the
prior information will always be computationally intensive4 and
future advances in mathematical or computer science5,6 may lead
to insecurities in such approaches. Indeed, given enough
computational resources the cryptosystem can be broken with
current technology7–9. In contrast, quantum digital signatures
(QDS) offer security veriﬁed by information-theoretical limits
and quantum mechanics10,11. QDS is, roughly speaking, a
quantum version of the Lamport public key based scheme for
digital signatures10,12.
In a digital signature scheme, it is vital not only that the public
key reveals limited information about the private key, but also that
the recipients of the public key can be sure that they have the same
public key in order to prevent repudiation of a signature. Classical
public keys are readily veriﬁed to be identical. Comparing
quantum systems, however, is nontrivial13,14 and in general
difﬁcult to implement10. In QDS, security against forging of a
message either by Bob or Charlie, or by a fourth external party, is
guaranteed as Alice alone has full knowledge about the quantum
signature states. Security against repudiation by Alice, in other
words that Bob and Charlie will agree on the validity of a
forwarded message, is realised, roughly speaking, by ensuring that
they have identical quantum signatures. The system must also be
robust, implying that if all parties act as prescribed by the protocol,
classical messages sent from Alice to any single recipient will be
conﬁrmed as authentic, except with negligible probability in the
presence of realistic (experimental) imperfections in equipment.
Also, if the authenticated message is forwarded, the message’s
authenticity will be conﬁrmed except with negligible probability.
In our system, the signatures are encoded as the relative phase
shifts of coherent states of light15. Quantum comparison of
coherent states may be implemented using a 50:50 beamsplitter
and has a higher success probability than general comparison
methods16. Our experimental setup provides a method for two
parties (Bob and Charlie) to receive quantum signatures, which
serve as analogues to the public keys in classical cryptography
schemes, from an untrusted Alice. These signature states are then
used for the full QDS protocol. This allows Alice to sign a
message so that it can be validated by Bob and/or Charlie. If an
accepted message is forwarded, for example, from Bob to Charlie,
then the forwarded message is guaranteed to also be accepted by
Charlie as genuinely coming from Alice.
Results
Principles of QDS. Figure 1a shows how two coherent states
of light mix on a 50:50 beamsplitter17. A coherent state |aS is a
quantum state, which closely resembles a classical electro-
magnetic wave. In mathematical terms, a^|aS¼ a|aS, where a^ is
the annihilation operator for the relevant electromagnetic ﬁeld
mode, and a is a complex number. The input states to the
beamsplitter are |aS and |bS and the output states ðabÞ/ ﬃﬃ2p 
and ðaþ bÞ/ ﬃﬃ2p . Clearly if a¼b then ðabÞ/ ﬃﬃ2p ¼ 0j i, the
vacuum state, and no light exits through that port. This simple
operation forms the basis of the multiport signature comparison
system employed by Bob and Charlie, shown in Fig. 1b. At
each receiver the signature from Alice is split into two equal-
amplitude components, and one of these is shared with the other
receiver, who does the same to their copy of the signature. The
retained component of the signature is then mixed on a beams-
plitter with the component transmitted from the other receiver.
It can be seen from Fig. 1a that if the two components are the
same, then the original signature will be recovered through one
port of the beamsplitter, and |0S will be generated at the other.
For any other input state, the multiport renders the individual
out-bound signature state symmetric with respect to Bob and
Charlie. Recall, in order to repudiate a message, Alice has to cause
a disagreement between Bob and Charlie concerning the validity
of her message. As the states exiting the multiport are symmetric
with respect to Bob’s and Charlie’s systems, Bob and Charlie’s
measurement results will obey the same statistics, and thus if
one party validates, so will the other. This is explained in more
detail later.
To utilize the QDS protocol, Alice randomly selects a series of
quantum states |aeiyS where a is ﬁxed, yA{2pp/N, p¼ 0, 1, y,
N 1}, and N is the number of possible phase encodings. The
phase of each state is analogous to the classical private key. The
principles of quantum mechanics prohibit determining the phases
of the states, that is, the private key, with complete certainty if we
only have access to the quantum state14,18. Each message bit is
signed using a key of length L. For a one-bit message m, either 0
or 1, Alice generates two sets rm;k
 L 1
k¼ 0 of phase-encoded states,
with randomly chosen phases deﬁning the corresponding private
keys. Alice sends one copy of the pair of sets to Bob and one to
Charlie. Bob and Charlie pass the complete series of encoded
states {r0,k}k and {r1,k}k through the multiport of Fig. 1b. If the
original signature states were identical coherent states, this
operation will preserve them, otherwise it will symmetrize the
overall state shared by Bob and Charlie, which prevents repu-
diation by Alice. Bob and Charlie then store their phase-encoded
states in a quantum memory19. Quantum memories are a
relatively immature technology20 and have yet to demonstrate
long-term storage of quantum states. In our experimental system,
Bob and Charlie measure the phase of the laser pulses
immediately after they have left the multiport.
In the general case, to send a signed message, Alice sends the
message and the classical description of the corresponding private
key states to Bob (for example). Bob checks the classical
description of the key states against those stored in his memory
as follows. He generates coherent states according to Alice’s
description, individually interferes them with the corresponding
states in his memory, and checks whether the number of
photodetection events at the signal null-port is smaller than saL,
in which case the message is conﬁrmed to be valid. The fraction sa
is called the authentication threshold. Alice must share a well-
deﬁned phase reference with all of the receivers to ensure that
their measurement of her phase encodings is correct. Our
experimental system time multiplexes the encoded signal and
delayed reference pulse in one ﬁbre. The exact mechanism is
outlined in the Methods. Assuming that the authenticity of the
message has been conﬁrmed, Bob can then prove to Charlie that
he has received that particular signed message from Alice. To do
this, he forwards the message and the classical description of the
signature states corresponding to the message he received from
Alice to Charlie. To verify a signed message forwarded by Bob,
Charlie follows the same procedure as Bob, but with a modiﬁed
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threshold sv4sa, called the veriﬁcation threshold. The difference
in the thresholds sa and sv is required to ensure security against
repudiation by Alice, depends on the parameters of our system
and will be given later. Essentially, since Bob and Charlie have
symmetric quantum signature states they will obtain the same
measurement statistics. The gap between sa and sv ensures that
Alice cannot make one of them accept and the other reject a
message, except with vanishingly small probability.
The choice of mean photon number per pulse |a|2 for the
coherent states emitted by Alice to each party depends on the
number of possible phase encodings N and the signature length
L. Figure 2 shows how the information about the phase of each
encoded laser pulse, available to a malicious party, given by the
von Neumann entropy21 of the state rSingle deﬁned by:
rSingle¼
1
N
XN  1
k¼ 0
a exp 2pik/Nð Þj i a exp 2pik/Nð Þh j; ð1Þ
varies with increasing |a|2, for two receivers (T¼ 2). In practice,
we must ensure that the information about the whole signature
known by Alice far exceeds that which is accessible to a malicious
party with access to all signature states in circulation, that is,
L  log2(N)bL T  S(rSingle). We will return to the issue of security
below; a more detailed analysis is given in the Supplementary
Discussion, where we ﬁnd the optimal attacks and calculate the
various cheating probabilities. It is an important assumption we
adhere to that the channels from Alice to Bob’s and Charlie’s
inputs to the multiport are under the control of the honest
receiving parties, that is, an external party may not tamper with
the states sent, although the channel is not assumed to be private.
Otherwise a man-in-the-middle (impersonation) attack, where
the attacker swaps Alice’s quantum signatures for their own,
becomes possible. If authenticated quantum channels are
presumed not to be available impersonation attacks possibly
could be countered in a way similar to in quantum key
distribution (QKD) as Alice is sending a restricted set of
quantum messages. For this reason, in the more detailed
security analysis, we have focused on the aspects of the QDS
protocol that are genuinely different from the QKD setting.
Schemes for either QKD or QDS that use linearly independent
states, and which counter impersonation attacks through partial
disclosure of key or signature states and discussion over an
authenticated classical channel remain vulnerable to attacks using
unambiguous state discrimination22. Such attacks, however,
only place an upper bound on the total allowed loss. In our
implementation, this bound is high and not of concern, as the
success probability for an unambiguous measurement that
distinguishes between all eight ideal quantum signature states is
low, of the order of 10 9.
Honest Alice. Figure 3 shows the experimental results obtained
by Charlie in the system using eight equally spaced phase
encodings (N¼ 8) and an honest Alice sending the same sig-
natures to both Bob and Charlie. For these measurements the
phase modulator in the Alice to Bob ﬁbre was deactivated. The
dashed lines represent the predictions for the quantities using a
theoretical model that is explained in more detail in the Methods,
while the data points are actual experimentally recorded values.
As the mean photon number per pulse launched by Alice into the
comparison system increases, so the count rate at the detectors
increases. The multiport null-port count rates are signiﬁcantly
lower than those at the signal port but are non-zero. The null-
port counts are primarily owing to the interferometric fringe
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visibility of the multiport (although background events at the
detectors do make a small contribution)23. This multiport null-
port rate sets a baseline for the system operating with an honest
Alice. The encoding error is deﬁned as the number of temporally
ﬁltered pulses detected by a receiver at his signal null-port,
divided by the temporally ﬁltered total number of pulses recorded
by that receiver. The encoding error rate is constant within
experimental ﬂuctuations across the range of experimentally
examined values of |a|2, as the effects of intersymbol interference
and background events in the detectors are negligible. Each of the
six detectors has a mean dark-count rate of 320 counts
per second, and the probability of temporal intersymbol
interference for each detector is 3 10 8.
Detection of discrepancies. A necessary requirement for a sys-
tem to be immune to Bob’s forgery is that Charlie is capable of
detecting a discrepancy between Alice’s chosen phase encoding in
a signature state and Bob’s average best guess of the phase.
A discrepancy will cause a higher probability for a photodetection
event on the signal null-port in the case when Charlie measures
the pulse using a phase different from that actually encoded on
the pulse. We experimentally veriﬁed this by looking at the
encoding error at Charlie if he measures using a phase different
from that deﬁned by Alice. The results are shown in Fig. 4. This
allows us to characterize the effects of a mismatch between the
encodings in true and forged quantum signatures. The off-diag-
onal elements correspond to Charlie measuring using a phase
different from that used by Alice. The results show that Charlie
can detect an increase in his encoding error percentage when Bob
(or another external party) attempts to forge a message. A greater
difference between the probabilities of null-port events for
differing and identical phases reduces the required key length for
a desired level of security.
Certain types of malicious activities by Alice can also be
detected by monitoring the multiport null-port count rates. We
experimentally tested the case where Alice sends different sig-
natures to Bob and Charlie. The phase modulator in the ﬁbre
connecting Alice to Bob was used to change the phase encoding
of two pulses in every 16 by a ﬁxed phase, and Charlie’s count
rate at the multiport null-port and error rate were monitored. The
results for the raw count rate at the multiport null-port can be
seen in Fig. 5. It can be observed from Fig. 5 that as Alice
increases the magnitude of the phase difference between the
states, the count rate at Charlie’s null-port increases as expected.
Discussion
A more careful security analysis can be found in the
Supplementary Discussion, but will be outlined here. We identify
two classes of forging attacks. In the active attack the malicious
party (Bob or Charlie) is allowed to alter the states he forwards to
the other party within the multiport to optimize his later cheating
probability. In a passive attack, the recipients of the quantum
signatures are benevolent throughout the signature distribution
phase but will attempt to falsify a message later. This is a
restricted setting, which corresponds to the case where each
recipient is a priori equally likely to be the forger, or when a
trusted third party holds the multiport. An external party, who
does not hold any signature copies, will have a lower probability
for successfully forging a message.
The probability of cheating in a passive attack can be evaluated
using the experimental results presented in Fig. 4. This
probability is also central to estimating the cheating probabilities
using active attacks. To counter against active attacks, the
outcomes at the multiport null-ports during signature distribu-
tion must be taken into account. In short, a low count rate at the
multiport null-port guarantees that the probabilities of cheating
using the active and passive attacks will not differ substantially.
We now proceed to calculate the probability of cheating for a
passive attack, saving the case of an active attack for the
Supplementary Discussion. Assuming Bob is the forger, his
optimal passive strategy for forging the message, say m¼ 0,
consists of producing a ‘best guess’ of the private key by
inspecting his copy of the corresponding signature state and
forwarding this guess to Charlie. We assume that the phases of
the states have been generated independently and uniformly at
random. Then Bob’s optimal strategy is to employ a single
generalized measurement applied on each of the states in his
signature. The probability of causing a photodetection event,
when verifying a single state in the signature, is then given by
pforgery ¼ min
ff gf g
1
N
X
f
X
y
Tr fr
y
 
cf;y; ð2Þ
where cf,y is the probability of a photodetection event in Charlie’s
signal null-port arm, given that ry is the coherent state sent by
Alice, with phase y, and the phase angle declared by Bob is f. The
operators Pf describe the measurement made by Bob, on the
signature copy or copies he has access to, to select the best
possible phase angle f. Bob’s optimal measurement, minimizing
the probability to cause a photodetection event is a minimum cost
measurement18, with the cost matrix C with elements cf,y.
The cost matrix C is obtained experimentally for our system,
and is related to the encoding error matrix shown in Fig. 4. The
cost matrix additionally takes into account vacuum events on the
signal ports, which are not included in the calculation of the
encoding error. The full cost matrix is given in the Supplementary
Discussion. We assume that the states in both Bob’s and Charlie’s
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Figure 3 | Experimentally measured detector event count rates and
encoding error for receiver Charlie. The system clock rate was 100MHz
and eight equally spaced phase encodings were used. Data points represent
actual experimental results while dashed lines are theoretical predictions.
The raw count rate is the detector click rate summed over both of Charlie’s
signal SPADs after the demodulating interferometers. The time gated count
rate is the raw count rate after temporal ﬁltering using a 2 ns duration
window centred on the expected arrival time to reduce the effects of
background events, temporal intersymbol interference23 and non-
interfering photons. The encoding error is the number of temporally ﬁltered
detector events recorded by Charlie at the signal null-port divided by
the total number of temporally ﬁltered detector events he recorded. The
experimental values have a square root uncertainty in count rate, while
uncertainty in the mean photon number is dominated by a worst case
scenario assumption than the pulse-to-pulse variance in the output
power of our laser is the experimentally measured maximum of ±1.5%.
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms2172
4 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:1174 | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms2172 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
& 2012 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.
quantum signatures are perfect, without the loss of generality, as
(random) imperfections could only degrade the probability of
getting Charlie to accept a forgery. If Bob is honest then the
maximum probability of causing a photodetection event is poriginal
(equal to the largest diagonal element(s) of C). In our experiment
the diagonal elements of C exhibit a small standard deviation
around a well-deﬁned mean. As long as pforgery4poriginal, given a
large enough sample size (that is, signature length L), cheating
and honest scenarios can be distinguished using statistical
methods. For the values pforgery and poriginal, one may set the
authentication and veriﬁcation thresholds as sa¼ 1/3 gþ poriginal
and sv¼ 2/3 gþ poriginal. The gap g¼ pforgery poriginal appears as
the central parameter of the cheating probabilities and is equal to
8.03 10 4±0.3 10 4 for our system.
The probability of forging using a passive attack equals the
probability of a cheating Bob causing fewer than svL photodetec-
tion events in Charlie’s signal null-port arm. Using Hoeffding’s
inequalities24, as outlined in the Supplementary Methods, we
bound this as
eforging  2 exp  2
9
g2L
	 

: ð3Þ
Analogously, the probability erobustness, for Bob and Charlie to
reject a message from Alice, if all parties are honest, is
erobustness  2 exp  2
9
g2L
	 

: ð4Þ
Without errors caused by imperfections in the components,
honest Bob and Charlie would never reject a message from an
honest Alice. For the derivation of the parameters above see the
Supplementary Discussion.
Further to the probability of forging a message, there also exists
a probability of repudiation. To repudiate her signature, a
malevolent Alice needs to prepare the signature states so that Bob
accepts and yet Charlie rejects the message when Bob forwards it,
or vice versa. For this purpose, she may send different signature
states to Charlie and Bob, or more generally, she may use any
type of 2L mode states, including entangled and mixed states.
However, regardless of her choice of states, assuming an ideal
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multiport, the signature states Charlie and Bob end up with are
symmetric under the swap of Charlie and Bob’s systems. Thus,
the probability matrix describing the a priori occurrence of
photodetection events in Bob and Charlie is symmetric. To
maximize the probability of causing a mismatch in Charlie and
Bob, required for repudiation, the most Alice can achieve is that
with probability 1/2, Charlie detects a photon and Bob does not,
and with probability 1/2 the opposite. To ensure repudiation of
the signature, the number of cases where Charlie detects photons
and Bob does, or vice versa, needs to be higher than gL, and
the probability of this happening is upper bounded by10,16
erepudiation¼ (1/2)gL/3. Imperfections could increase the factor of
1/2 in erepudiation. However, for our system this increase is such
that erepudiation is smaller than eforging, and thus eforging bounds
the overall security of our system.
The work detailed in this article is an experimental
demonstration of the distribution of quantum signatures. This
system could also be used to share quantum frames of reference,
and may be applicable to further quantum information protocols
and experiments25,26. The current system does not utilize any
form of quantum memory and it would be desirable to combine it
with some form of the same20,27,28, or ﬁnd a way to circumvent
this requirement completely. Other challenges include extending
the distance between Bob and Charlie beyond the currentB5m.
At present, the pulses from the other party’s half of the signature
must arrive at the ﬁnal beamsplitter cube at the same time as
those from the party’s retained half of the signature. As the
distance between Bob and Charlie is increased, so the delay in the
paths for the retained portion must increase, and this leads to
instabilities increasing the error rate. This could be alleviated by
temporarily storing the retained portions in a short-term
quantum memory. Currently, the system is designed to operate
with two receivers and scaling it up to a greater number of
receivers is an area for future research. It is possible to generalize
the scheme using balanced multiports, as suggested by Andersson
et al.16 Furthermore, Andersson et al.16 suggested that the
multiports may be realised in a time-resolved fashion or using
ﬁbre couplers.
The primary reason for the small g value is the low photon ﬂux
at the receiver’s detectors. Reducing the loss of the multiport from
the current 7.5 dB would be desirable. It may be possible to
replace the air-gaps with ﬁbre stretchers but these can increase
the quantity of ﬁbre within the system and lead to reduced
up-time. Additionally, reducing the loss of the system overall will
reduce the signature length L required for a given level of security.
With the current system parameters, for signature lengths L of the
order of 5 106 pulses the bounds on the failure probability
become non-trivial (and decay exponentially quickly from that
point on). Increasing the clock rate, and therefore the transmis-
sion rate of the system, is consequently an obvious goal. The
phase modulators, lasers and driving electronics, are all capable of
clock-rates up to a maximum of 3.3GHz.
Methods
System implementation. The experimental implementation of the QDS system is
shown schematically in Fig. 6. This system encodes phase onto highly attenuated
laser pulses and compares two copies of the quantum signature, simultaneously
symmetrizing the states, using the multiport. Finally, Bob and Charlie measure the
phases of the pulses and detect the photons using silicon single-photon avalanche
diodes (Si-SPADs)29. The addition of a phase modulator in the ﬁnal section of ﬁbre
between Alice and Bob allows us to test the multiport performance when Alice tries
to cheat by sending different signatures to different recipients. The air-gap in the
other arm allows the transmission losses to be balanced between each arm so that
the same |a|2 value is launched to each recipient, and permits compensation for
small path-length differences between the two launch arms; |a|2 is deﬁned after
Alice’s phase modulator/air-gap at the inputs to the multiport.
To ensure a high interferometric fringe visibility in the interferometers of the
system, it is necessary to ensure that the relative path-length differences remain
constant to within a fraction of the emission wavelength of the source laser30.
Adjustable air-gaps in active feedback loops are used to compensate for any slow
time-dependent variations in the relative path lengths23. The fringe visibility is
monitored during operation of the system and when a deviation from the expected
value is obtained, signature distribution is halted and tuning carried out using a
higher intensity signal with known phase modulation until the optimum visibility
is obtained. Our interferometers had fringe visibilities of 98%. It is likely that the
greatest contributions to the reduction in the visibility of the interferometers from
100% are owing to the linewidth of our laser source30 and loss of polarization
extinction ratio (PER) at non-ideal fusion splice and ﬂat-polish bulkhead joins
between the various ﬁbres, which comprise the system. The stress members in the
polarization-maintaining ﬁbre must be aligned by eye during the splicing process,
introducing human error and the ﬂat-polish bulkhead connectors have variable
misalignment because of manufacturing tolerances.
The system has been assembled from polarization-maintaining ﬁbre, which
supports a single mode at a wavelength of 850 nm. The use of polarization-
maintaining ﬁbre ensures good fringe visibility in the interferometers of the system
as high visibilities can be achieved when interfering two highly linearly polarized
light ﬁelds31, and the use of a single spatial mode in the ﬁbre reduces temporal
broadening of the pulse. An operating wavelength of 850 nm was chosen to provide
compatibility with comparatively mature high detection efﬁciency thick junction
Si-SPADs29. The system operates at a pulse repetition frequency of 100MHz
to avoid intersymbol interference when using these detectors29. Si-SPADs were
selected as detectors as the losses of the system (7.5 dB from the comparison stage
input to each demodulation interferometer and 7.1 dB for each demodulation
interferometer) mean that the pulses transmitted by Alice are in the single-photon
regime at the detectors. Detectors of this type have been previously been used
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successfully in quantum information experiments32,33. The detection efﬁciency of
the Si-SAPDs used for these experiments exhibits a count rate dependent variation.
At higher count rates, the detection efﬁciency of the detectors decreases, reaching a
minimum of 36.8% as opposed to the maximum value34 of 42%.
This system time multiplexes a phase reference pulse between successive
100MHz clocked signal pulses using an asymmetric double Mach–Zehnder
approach as used in many QKD systems employing phase basis sets35. In an ideal
system, the receivers would utilize their paths with air-gaps to delay only the signal
pulse so that it recombines with the corresponding reference, revealing the phase
encoding. However, in a real system there will be photons, which take non-
interfering paths in sender and receiver (that is, both short paths or both delayed
paths) contributing nothing to the signature35 and these are software gated from
the photon arrival times recorded using the free-running Si-SPADs. In post-
processing, the time gating software opens a window of duration 2 ns centred
on the expected arrival time of a pulse and disregards events which occur
outside of this window.
Photon source characterization. A vertical cavity surface emitting laser
(VCSEL)36 emitting at a wavelength of 849.8 nm, and with a spectral full-width at
half maximum (FWHM) of 0.23 nm, was selected as the photon source in these
experiments. In common with most other diode lasers, VCSELs exhibit a
temperature dependent output wavelength37 and consequently the VCSEL used in
these experiments was mounted on a custom temperature controller and
maintained at an operating temperature of 15±0.1 1C to ensure wavelength
stability. The central wavelength of the laser had a measured wavelength shift of
77 pm per 1C. The laser was driven using a 500-ps wide square electrical pulse at a
repetition rate of 100MHz using a commercial driving board, which ultimately
produced optical output pulses of duration 780 ps FWHM.
To improve the PER of the VCSEL37, it was necessary for the laser output to be
transmitted through two high extinction ratio (in excess of 10,000:1) polarizers
before being launched into the single-mode polarization maintaining ﬁbre from
which the main part of the optical system was comprised. The VCSEL output had a
PER of 7:2 while for the light after the cleanup polarizers the PER was measured
as being in excess of 1,200:1.
Our measurement of the pulse-to-pulse variance of the output power of the
VCSEL was limited by the resolution and noise level of our detector, but can be
stated to be lower than 3%. The mean photon number per pulse |a|2 was set using a
computer-controlled motorized attenuator. A stepper motor drives a screw into or
out of a collimated beam to provide the required attenuation. The motorized
attenuator exhibits reproducibility of attenuation setting to within 1% of the
calibrated value. In all uncertainty analyzes we have assumed a worst case scenario
that the uncertainty in |a|2 is dominated by the pulse-to-pulse variance in the
output power of the VCSEL.
The sender and receivers utilize phase modulators with a voltage to enact an
optical phase change of p radians (Vp) of 6V. The driving electronics for the phase
modulator have a pulse-to-pulse amplitude variance, which corresponds to a
variance in the desired phase encoding of ±1.6 10 3 radians or ±0.2%
of the difference between successive values when 8 encodings are used.
Theoretical modelling. The theoretical model for the count rates is based on
our previous work detailed in ref. 23. The theoretical model requires knowledge
of the system losses, clock rate (100MHz), detector dark-count rate (320 counts
per second), detector detection efﬁciency (42%), classical visibility (98%) and
system instrument response function (modelled as the PerkinElmer thick junction
silicon single-photon avalanche diodes of per ref. 23). To calculate the raw count
rate at the receiver we model the multiport and receiver as losses of 7.5 and 7.1 dB,
respectively, without taking into account interferometric visibility, as in equation
(1) of ref. 23. The temporally ﬁltered count rate at the receiver was calculated
following the same method as outlined in ref. 23 with the same instrument
response function parameters. The encoding error was calculated using a modiﬁed
form of the equations used to predict the quantum bit error rate. In equation (8) of
ref. 23 the protocol-dependent scaling term (aProtocol) was set equal
to unity so that the dark-count contribution was given by
1/2ð ÞuRDarkDT
RTimeGated DTð Þ ð5Þ
where u is the clock frequency of the system (100MHz), RDarkis the detector dark-
count rate (320 counts per second), DT is the time gate duration (2 ns centred on
the expected peak position) and RTimeGated(DT) is the count rate remaining after
temporal ﬁltering by the 2 ns gate, as indicated by the triangular points on Fig. 3.
Calculation of the temporally ﬁltered rates proceeded as in the case of ref. 23.
The raw count rates at the null, or vacuum state, ports of the multiport, were
predicted by modelling the multiport as a loss of 7.5 dB and then utilizing the
deﬁnition of visibility as
Visibility¼ IMax  IMin
IMax þ IMin ð6Þ
(where IMax is the intensity of an interference maximum and IMin is the intensity of
an interference minimum) with the count rates substituted for the intensities. For a
visibility of 98% the theoretically predicted count rate at the signal output was
substituted into the visibility equation as IMax and the equation rearranged to
give IMin as the count rate on the multiport null-port.
The theoretical model can be used to predict the results shown in Fig. 4
(and by extension the cost matrix C) and Fig. 5. The visibility is modelled using
equation (6) above, equation (5) of ref. 23 and the cosine dependency of the phase
sensitivity of a Mach–Zehnder interferometer given in equation (36) of ref. 38.
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